What is particularly attractive about Brueggemann's exegesis-besides his superbly sensitive literary handling of scripture-is his passion for uncovering the social context and function of biblical texts, their function either to express and thus to legitimate a given social order or to voice a critical alternative to the status quo.
3 This sociological analysis of texts, which Brueggemann has honed through interaction with the work of George Mendenhall and Norman Gottwald, has allowed him to bridge the hermeneutical gap between the ancient text and our modern, and increasingly postmodern, situation. 4 By suggesting continuities between the status quo of Israel's day and our contemporary North American culture, Brueggemann allows the biblical text to address us in both judgment and hope. 5 In this article I am concerned with the specific application of Brueggemann's sociological analysis to texts of creation theology in the Hebrew scriptures. It is Brueggemann's judgment that such texts typically serve the socially conservative function of legitimating the status quo of Israel's royal establishment, specifically the Jerusalem monarchy. The social function of creation texts, however, is not simply conservative, Brueggemann argues; it is oppressive. If the regnant order is rooted in creation, then any challenge to that order is religiously disqualified. The pain of the marginalized is therefore silenced and social transformation is impossible.
S Brueggemann's Hermeneutical Categories
In order to understand the force of this judgment about creation theology, it will be necessary to elucidate the basic, underlying hermeneutical categories that Brueggemann employs in reading creation texts. These categories, which at least since The Prophetic Imagination are operative in all of Brueggemann's exegetical and theological work on the Bible, are explicitly articulated in two important articles. The first, published in 1979, is entitled "Trajectories in Old Testament Literature and the Sociology of Ancient Israel." The second, published in 1985 in two parts, is entitled "A Shape for Old Testament Theology." 6 In these articles Brueggemann identifies in the Hebrew scriptures two opposing tendencies or theological trajectories which are rooted in two different Israelite traditions. The first, which he names "structure legitimation," is associated with the Abrahamic-Davidic traditions. These traditions are characterized by a concern for universality and order. Their overriding claim is that life is good and God is gracious, reliable, and faithful. In these traditions, God functions primarily in a stabilizing capacity, guaranteeing and legitimating the social order. In contrast, Brueggemann identifies a tendency or trajectory, which he calls the "embrace of pain," that is associated with the Mosaic-prophetic traditions. These traditions are characterized by a concern for justice, rooted not in any universal moral order, but in the scandalous particularity of Israel's Exodus experience. Their overriding claim is that life is not as it ought to be and thus they articulate, in the name of Yahweh, the covenant God, a critique of the present order and a call for moral and social transformation. In these traditions, God functions primarily as the free and transcendent ground of criticism of the status quo.
In The Prophetic Imagination, Brueggemann further describes the first trajectory as a "royal" or "imperial consciousness," the paradigmatic manifestation of which is found in the hierarchical Egyptian social order that enslaved the ancient Hebrews. This oppressive social order, understood as the eternal expression of universal cosmic order, was legitimated by a pantheon of static gods of state and was mediated by the divine pharaoh, their son and image. 7 For Brueggemann, this royal consciousness was next manifested in the Solomonic monarchy, with its immense building program utilizing forced labor, its standing army of horses and chariots, its secular wisdom literature, and the establishment of the temple as a royal chapel, the liturgy of which included royal psalms celebrating the king as God's divine son. Thus what Gerhard von Rad had characterized as a time of Israelite "enlightenment" Brueggemann, following Mendenhall, calls the "paganization" of Israel. 8 The oppressive royal consciousness of Egypt had been the context for the radical, liberating event of the Exodus, which arose out of and articulated an alternative vision that Brueggemann calls the "prophetic imagination." Similarly, the monarchy, especially in the South, with its temple-Zion complex, required the rise of the prophetic movement which proclaimed God's intrusion into Israelite history to judge and to liberate. 9 Brueggemann's categories are further nuanced-and possibly even transformed-in his 1984 monograph on the psalter, entitled The Message of the Psalms. 10 There, in place of his bipolar, dyadic schema of royal and prophetic, he introduces a triadic schema of orientation, disorientation, and new orientation. He classifies and exegetes various psalms in terms of this new triadic schema.
In this triad, "orientation" corresponds to the royal consciousness, the trajectory of structure legitimation. Typical psalms of orientation are royal 7 psalms, Torah psalms, wisdom psalms, and creation psalms. These psalms make claims concerning the way the world is normatively ordered and generate an attitude of confident security for those who conform to this order.
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The terms "disorientation" and "new orientation" correspond to two successive moments of the prophetic imagination. The first, that of disorientation, is equivalent to the embrace of pain, the voicing of an awareness that the realities of lived experience do not correspond to the orienting claims of the imperial consciousness. Psalms of disorientation include laments and imprecatory psalms. They constitute a judgment or critique of the present system and generate an attitude of both honesty about pain and suspicion about naive claims of the tradition.
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The term "new orientation" corresponds to the second moment of the prophetic imagination, namely, the move from criticism to hope, a move energized by the alternative future that God offers. Psalms of new orientation include primarily the thanksgiving psalms, which tell stories of God's deliverance from disorienting situations. Such psalms generate thankful historical memory of pain and liberation. Brueggemann also, however, includes songs of trust or confidence, enthronement psalms, and the hallelujah psalms found at the end of the psalter as liberating psalms of new orientation. 13 Interestingly, four years after The Message of the Psalms, in his 1988 book entitled Israel's Praise, Brueggemann's hermeneutic of suspicion led him to reread the enthronement psalms and the hallelujah psalms (with the exception of Psalm 146) as oppressive psalms of orientation which ignore, if not suppress, the abrasive pain of the marginalized.
14 Later in this article, I shall address the significance of this shift.
In concluding this section, I must state that I find Brueggemann's hermeneutical categories and sociological approach both creative and fruitful. These categories and this approach are, of course, indebted in varying degrees to the work of numerous previous scholars, an indebtedness that Brueggemann fully acknowledges in his ample footnotes.
15 Without claiming, therefore, strict originality for his hermeneutical proposals, Brueggemann's insightful synthesis nevertheless has provided readers of 1 scripture with an illuminating set of categories that enlivens biblical texts and allows these texts to speak powerfully to our own context.
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• Brueggemann's Assessment of Creation
When Brueggemann applies his hermeneutical proposals to the theme of creation, a problem arises. Although he does make some positive statements regarding creation theology, his typical judgment is overwhelmingly negative. In The Prophetic Imagination, for example. Brueggemann asserts that "in fact, creation faith tended to give questions of order priority over questions of justice. It tended to value symmetry inordinately and wanted to silence the abrasive concerns of the have-nots."
17 This is a historical claim about ancient Israel, but Brueggemann also makes the systematic claim that creation faith "is more inclined toward social stability than toward social transformation and liberation." 18 Although he admits that this need not be so, he also believes that "it regularly is so. Creation theology readily becomes imperial propaganda and ideology."
19 Such theology is not simply "open to exploitation" by those whose interests are politically conservative, but it "easily, readily, and frequently" is thus exploited.
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Even this assessment, however, is surpassed by his statement in Israel's Praise. There Brueggemann admits, with superb understatement, "I incline to take a more critical view of creation theology in ancient Israel than do many of my colleagues." His position is summarized as follows:
The social function of creation theology. . . is characteristically to establish, legitimate, and advocate order at the cost of transformation. . . . The problem is that regularly (I believe inevitably), creation theology is allied with the king, with the royal liturgy, and therefore with reasons of state. The outcome is to coalesce the royal ordering of economic distribution and political power with the goodness and reliability of God's intended order, thereby absolutizing the present order as the very structure God has decreed in and for creation. Even in the midst of this programmatic statement, Brueggemann does devote two (somewhat grudging) sentences to possible positive functions of creation theology. These two sentences, however, constitute his sole concession and are followed by no less than twenty pages of sustained and insightful analysis devoted to elucidate the conservative, oppressive function of creation theology in ancient Israel, as it is manifested in the psalter.
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Now, it is undoubtedly true that creation theology may be-and has been-used oppressively to justify a particular social order or political program. In this Brueggemann is entirely correct. It seems that this was the primary function of such theology in the ancient Near East, certainly in Egyptian, Sumerian, Akkadian, and possibly Canaanite cultures.
23 There can also be little doubt that creation theology functioned oppressively in the history of the Jerusalem monarchy, in much the way Brueggemann portrays it. The most important evidence for this is found in those royal psalms that depict the Davidic king as God's chosen son, who is then addressed with divine epithets or imbued with divine characteristics such as 22 Ibid., 101-121. 23 That creation theology functioned in a conservative fashion, legitimating the royal status quo, is clearest in the case of Sumero-Akkadian cultures. At least five interlocking claims are significant here. The first is that the Sumerian king list claims that kingship is inaugurated by the gods and handed down from heaven at creation. The second is the reference, found in the Tukulti-Ninurta Epic and in various letters of Assyrian court astrologers, to kings as the image of deity, which implies the divine right to rule on behalf of the gods. Third, in writings such as the Eridu Genesis and the Harab Myth, cities, over which kings ruled and in which their reigns were consolidated, were believed to have been founded not by mere humans, but by the gods at creation. Fourth, the prologue to the laws of Hammurapi, who was a king of Babylon in the eighteenth century BCE, claims that these laws were given at creation, resulting in their unchangeable and inviolable character. A possible exception to the conservative function of creation theology in the ancient Near East is the appeal to certain elements of the kingship ideology by the usurper of the Babylonian throne, Nabonidus, in the middle of the sixth century. Nabonidus appeals in his own favor to "the will of the gods" against his predecessor LabaSi-Marduk, even though he admits he has no dynastic claim to the throne. On Nabonidus's quest for the legitimacy of his nondynastic kingship as recorded in inscriptions 1, 13, and 15, the conquest of chaos. Such psalms were patently idolatrous in their original setting, and it was not until they came to be read messianically and eschatologically that they could function as a critique of the Jerusalem monarchy.
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In our own time, appeals to a creation order have been at the root of both South African apartheid and German National Socialism, to say nothing of the recent hyper-Calvinist movement known as Theonomy or Christian Reconstruction which, in the name of creation order, wants to reinstate in contemporary America the legislation and sanctions of the Hebrew scriptures. 25 What is not at all clear, however, is that creation theology inevitably functions in a conservative or oppressive manner. I am in agreement with Emil Brunner who, in conversation with Karl Barth about the appeal to creation in German National Socialism, argued against Barth that creation theology was open to a variety of political uses. Brunner distinguished specifically between three such uses; creation, he said, can function negatively-in a conservative and authoritarian manner, or positively in either a conservative or a revolutionary manner. 26 Whereas the negative function corresponds to Brueggemann's predominantly suspicious analysis, the positive conservative function of creation theology corresponds to Brueggemann's somewhat grudging admission that there is value to an orienting vision of life that, in the face of experiences of chaos, claims coherence, reliability, 24 The clearest cases are Ps 2:7-12; 45:2-7; 89:25-27. 35-37: and 110:1, 4. Psalm 89 may, however, already testify to a process of transformation, since the psalmist not only looked back to the Davidic ideal (vss. 1-37) from the point of view of God's evident rejection of the king (vss. 38-51), but included an unusual conditional clause in the Davidic covenant (\ss. 30-32), and mused on the mortality of all humanity, including the king (vss. 47-48). Despite the existence of psalms such as these and the clear historical portrayal of the abuse of monarchy in the Hebrew scriptures, it is noteworthy that no element of the Sumero-Akkadian kingship ideology is connected with creation theology in the Bible (see previous note). Indeed, some of this ideology is explicitly excluded. The Bible, for example, asserts not only the creation of all humans in God's image-commissioned to rule the earth (Genesis 1. Psalm 8)-but also the historical origin of kingship in the tenth century with Saul, its demise in the sixth century exile, the founding of the first city in ambiguous circumstances by Cain (Genesis 4). and both the historical origin of the Torah at Sinai and the subjection of the king to this Torah (Deuteronomy 17). 30 Of the possible extrabiblical examples that could be given. I shall mention one important cluster. If the Nazi appeal to blood and soil cited creation theology in order to justify oppression, we also should remember the Dutch Christians who resisted Nazi occupation of Holland, harboured Jewish fugitives, and endured the suffering of concentration camps, sustained all the while by perhaps the most articulate theology of creation to be found anywhere in Christendom. This creation theology, which can be traced back to the neo-Calvinian tradition of Abraham Kuyper and Groen van Pnnsterer, brought a tremendous challenge to the status quo of nineteenth-century Holland, resulting in a flurry of social activism that was understood as an alternative to both the French Revolution and British capitalism. The explicit, undergirding theological motif of this activism was that God's redemption is for the sake of creation, implying the mandate to transform human sociocultural life. 31 Although Fretheim's explication of this claim is multifaceted, we may distill three central points relevant to our purposes.
First, Egyptian slavery was evil precisely because it contravened God's creative purposes. Pharaoh's oppression of the Israelites was subject to Mosaic criticism insofar as this oppression attempted to shortcircuit God's original intent to bring blessing and harmony to all creatures, including Israel.
32 Hence, Fretheim comments that "a proper creation theology should be in constant challenge of the status quo rather than in support of it." 33 Second-and this is the flip side of the challenge-the deliverance of Israel, including the giving of the Torah, was fundamentally restorative, reclaiming human life in its fullness. 34 Since creation, like the Torah, is dynamic and developmental, Fretheim denies that redemption constitutes a mythic return to a primal origin, but he nevertheless affirms that "the objective of God's work in redemption is to free people to be what they were created to be." 35 The third relevant point is that God's purpose in the Exodus-to establish the Creator's name in all the earth-was not limited to Israel, but was cosmic in scope. Thus Israel's royal-priestly vocation (Exod 19:4-6) consisted in mediating the benefits of salvation to all the nations. 36 Creation, in other words, not only provided a basis to critique the Egyptian social order and norms for Israel's redeemed social life, but it also prevented a narrow, self-serving reading of Israel's election as a badge of national superiority by defining the purpose of election as service of others.
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A liberating creation theology can also be found in the first chapter of Genesis. As James Crenshaw stated, "The Bible opens with vigorous protest."
38 Not only does Genesis 1 dissent, as is widely recognized, from prevailing ancient Near Eastern cosmological and theological conceptions, 39 but, I have argued that the democratization of the image of God notion, in such a way that it is applied to all humanity in Gen 1:27, implies a radical critique of Babylonian sacral kingship and thus of the Babylonian social order which this sacral kingship legitimated. 40 . Not only does Wright read Romans, as Fretheim reads Exodus, as appealing to a creation theology, but he helpfully distinguishes the explicit rhetorical argument of the book, its "poetic sequence," from the wider-although implicit-world view and system of belief upon which Paul draws, the "narrative sequence." The third point I have cited from Fretheimthat the purpose of the Exodus is cosmic in scope-can be found in the text itself ("Indeed the whole earth is mine"; Exod 19:5b). With regard to the first two points, however, creation theology constitutes part of the implicit narrative sequence of Exodus. This is suggested by Fretheim* s emphasis on the placement of the Genesis creation account at the start of Israel's canonical story and the theological implications of this placement for reading Exodus (Fretheim, "Reclamation of Creation," 354-56). 38 power and purposes of the radically free and transcendent Creator. 41 He does not hesitate to state: "The text is revolutionary." 42 Since creation theology in Israel was not always revolutionary, but, on the contrary, often functioned oppressively (a point I have already conceded), we may ask how this transformation was achieved.
43 This is, of course, a complicated historical question, and its answer inevitably will involve a large measure of conjecture. Nevertheless, there seem to be at least two important factors involved in this shift. The first is the Israelite exile. By the time Genesis 1 was written as a preface to the Pentateuch, Israel was a marginalized, powerless people, uprooted from their land, having experienced the dissolution of temple and monarchy. This new social location was undoubtedly a crucial factor in the development of a liberating function for creation theology (evident in Genesis l). 44 Second, it seems likely that the liberating experience of the Exodus had a transformational effect on Israel's creation theology throughout the period of the tribal confederacy and the monarchy. The final fruit of this transformation is found in Genesis 1. Since creation is a dominant theme in the religions of the ancient Near East, its role as a minor subtheme in all the earliest Israelite materials is certainly surprising. Why is it that creation has been consistently subordinated to the Exodus, so much so that in von Rad's list of four or five uses of creation theology in the Hebrew scriptures, only 41 WCC, 1989 ] 23) to characterize the prophetic as a distinct biblical trajectory, since it was the vocation of prophets to take up critically and reinterpret a whole series of differing traditions, including the Exodus-Mosaic and royalDavidic traditions. It should also be noted that I am not claiming that all Israelites in exile were socially marginalized. This is patently false. Nevertheless, Babylonian exile signaled the ending of a cultural-political era and symbolic world, an ending that shook Israel to the core and generated a reinterpretation of the tradition.
one involves the thematization of creation as an independent subject in its own right, and then only in a few late texts? 45 I agree with Bernhard Anderson's suggestion that the theme of creation was intentionally suppressed in early Israel because it was inextricably bound up with a pagan mythological world view. Such a world view was antithetical to Israel's faith, which was historically based in the Exodus. It was not until a significant transformation of consciousness was effected by sustained and explicit focus on the mighty historical acts of Yahwehevidenced, for example, in what von Rad called the credos (the retelling of Israel's salvation history found in texts like Deut 6:20-25, 26:1-11, and Josh 24:1-15)-that creation, now purged of mythological conceptions, could become an independent theme in later scripture such as Genesis l.
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Von Rad himself made such a sharp distinction between mythic creation (derived from ancient Near Eastern models) and historical Exodus (which was unique to Israel) that he disqualified creation faith from being genuinely Yahwistic. 47 While this distinction between myth and history is often overblown and artificial, I believe Brueggemann's suspicion of creation themes is rooted in a genuine insight into what is theologically at stake here. Ancient Near Eastern creation faith is firmly embedded in a mimetic world view which seeks to set up, by liturgical and political intermediaries, a correspondence between a primal divine state of affairs and a matching human social order. The end result is the use of creation as an ideology to prohibit change and legitimate the social order as divinely willed. Biblical fai^h, however, is historical and covenantal in the sense that it gives humans room, in partnership with God, to explore with innovation and freedom genuinely new paths on their historical journey. 48 By affirming both human and divine freedom and partnership, this covenantal world view not only valorizes the historical process, but is able to relativize-and even critique-any present state of affairs in light of God's norms for that process.
Whatever the actual function, oppressive or otherwise, of creation in the time of the Israelite monarchy, by the time of the canonical book of Genesis, we find God's cosmic, creational intent for peace signaled thematically at the outset. As the preface not only to Genesis, but to the entire story of scripture, creation provides the ground for criticism of every system of historical injustice and a hope for an alternative future wherein God's intent will be restored. Thus what von Rad had called the unhappy "circumstance" of the canonical placing of creation at the start of the Bible turns out to be a matter of fundamental theological importance.
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• Brueggemann's Hermeneutical Shift
Happily, von Rad changed his mind about the significance of creation and came to a deep appreciation of creation theology, especially as found in the wisdom literature. 50 What is fascinating is that Brueggemann's 1972 book, In Man We Trust, is indebted to the later von Rad, as Brueggemann himself acknowledged. 51 Addressing both royal and wisdom themes, the book is permeated by a positive appreciation of the ordered regularity of creation and celebrates human maturity and responsibility in the world. If Brueggemann's later valorizing of the Mosiac and prophetic traditions may be viewed as a protest against the pretensions of Enlightenment autonomy and therefore as a celebration of God's intrusive presence to judge and to save, In Man We Trust is meant as a protest against the heteronomy of the ecclesiastical and theological status quo of the late 1960s. Brueggemann explicitly characterizes this status quo (which is his own heritage) as a neoorthodox Christianity informed by a theology of the "mighty acts of God and wedded to an evangelical Pietism." What In Man We Trust especially protests are the twin dogmas of human incapacity and an intrusive God, both mainstays of pietism, neoorthodoxy, and the biblical theology movement. Neoorthodoxy," Brueggemann admitted that In Man We Trust may be "only a tract for the time, perhaps a very brief time." 54 Certainly, six years later in The Prophetic Imagination he seems to have repudiated his earlier po sition. 55 What could have precipitated such a change? Undoubtedly, the times changed and different issues needed to be addressed. With the onset of the seventies and the eighties, Brueggemann probably began to discern in the churches a move from a neoorthodox heteronomy that stressed reli gious distinctiveness to an uncritical embrace of the modern autonomous stance of surrounding culture. Most likely this discernment was radicalized with the rebirth of the triumphal pax Americana under Ronald Reagan. Nevertheless, beyond this changed historical situation I would suggest another factor. Although In Man We Trust celebrates human responsibility and the reliability of the world, Brueggemann's articulation of the theme of "creation" is actually quite paltry. Apart from a few unsystematic, almost incidental, references, the book focuses on secularity, not creation. Indeed, by highlighting modern themes of human independence and the reliability of cosmic order, while downplaying any need for salvation, the book comes close to equating creation with secularity.
56 I believe that the lack of a clearly defined or articulated creation theology resulted in Brueggemann's (likely warranted) suspicions that there might be no substantial difference between the position expounded in In Man We Trust and the radical au tonomy of Enlightenment secularism.
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Β Creation Faith versus the Chaos-Cosmos Scheme
By 1978 Brueggemann had opted for a hermeneutical stance that privi leged salvation and deliverance themes and was suspicious of creation. Brueggemann's early protest against precisely these themes, however, indi cates that if creation theology can be used oppressively, so can a theology of salvation. Many fundamentalist and evangelical churches of this century, that Gottwald's proposal in The Tribes of Yahweh allows for a new articulation of the mighty acts of God in history that is not subject to the criticisms of confusing history (the facticity of events) with faith (theological claims about the events). 54 Breuggemann, In Man We Trust, 125. 55 Yet in The Land, published one year before The Prophetic Imagination, Brueggemann was still critical of the biblical theology movement for unnecessarily polarizing history and nature and for assuming that religious meaning is found only in "intrusive, disruptive discontinuities" (Brueggemann, The Land, 3, 51 for example, know next to nothing of creation theology; on the contrary, their theology of sin and salvation is characterized by otherworldly piety, an authoritarian ethical legalism, and a dualism regarding sacred and secular as well as soul and body. My own experience of such churches suggests that this theology typically generates a quietistic acceptance of the status quo; the possibility of social transformation is eliminated.
Social legitimation thus does not require a creation theology. It does, however, need to be rooted in some sense of primal normativity to which one can appeal. This normativity, however, can be embedded in paradigmatic historical examples as varied as the Mosaic law, the New Testament epistles, the Constitution of the United States of America, or statements such as "when I was your age.'" Furthermore, these normative appeals are usually linked to some experience of deliverance or salvation. Thus, appeals to the Mosaic law 7 may be combined with Exodus memory, the citing of the New Testament with a dramatic conversion experience, constitutional precedent with the American Revolution, and "when I was your age" with survival in the Depression years.
In each of these cases, nothing about the particular, historical memory prevents it from being remembered and interpreted nationalistically or selfrighteously in order to justify a partisan cause or institution. Even appeals to a creation order-as in apartheid-can be linked to a historical memoryas in the Afrikaner Great Trek or the Boer Wars-and used for oppression. I therefore find no persuasive evidence for Brueggemann's claim that Israelite slave memory of both the Exodus and parallel experiences of deliverance guarantees justice or openness to social transformation. 58 Indeed, it might be argued that any historical memory of deliverance that does not universalize to the common humanity of all people on the basis of a creation theology is in danger of interpreting such memory as a symbol of privilege, resulting in a triumphalistic world view which externalizes the other as enemy or inferior-the goyim, the infidels, the "damn communists/' Pedro Trigo, in his book Creation and History, refers to such a triumphalistic, polarized world view as the chaos-cosmos setting. Trigo, a Spanish Jesuit living in Venezuela, has written what is to my knowledge the first substantial study of creation by a liberation theologian. In a profound and stimulating section entitled "From Chaos and Cosmos to Faith in Creation," a section that deserves considerably more detailed treatment than I am able to render here, Trigo applies the chaos-cosmos polarization of 58 To be sure, Brueggemann does concede ("A Shape for Old Testament Theology. I," 46) that even the cross, the paradigmatic Christian symbol of the embrace of pain and the source of radical newness, is often "used to justify a theology of imperial exploitation.'* This admission, however, is atypical.
ancient Near Eastern cosmogonies to various contemporary geopolitical and ideological splits. 59 What all versions of this split have in common is a fundamentally ambiguous judgment about the nature of the world. Cosmos, the good, exists only in eternal struggle against chaos. Evil is thus equiprimordial with good, and life consists in ideological and political warfare against one's enemies, who are demonized and stripped of their humanity. This is Trigo's assessment of the oppressive function of the Western world view from the perspective of the marginalized-those identified with chaos-in Latin America.
The only adequate answer to this false ideological polarization, says Trigo, is biblical faith in God as Creator. Genuine creation faith breaks the spell of the chaos-cosmos scheme, not because the struggle against evil is illusory-it is not-but because the goodness of the Almighty God who is with us is still more primordial. Thus Trigo claims that Ronald Reagan, although justly denounced for the evil he has perpetrated in various Latin American countries, is nevertheless "a person for whom one ought to pray" although presumably one should not vote for him; Reagan is even "a candidate for salvation." 60 Trigo can make this claim, remarkable for a liberation theologian, because he distinguishes radically between creation as the conquest of chaos, a salvific event that demonizes and absolutizes two sides of a historical struggle, on the one hand, and, on the other, biblical creation faith, which relativizes both sides of this struggle vis-à-vis the sovereign and transcendent Creator. What Trigo means by biblical creation faith is thus remarkably similar to the theological category of creado ex nihilo. a category toward which he seems to be straining, although he never actually uses the term. 61 His interest is not, however, dogmatic, but practical and political. Like Brueggemann, he is interested in the possibility of justice rooted in God's radical freedom, even in a tyrannically closed situation of oppression. In such a situation, "faith in creation is. . . protest, and hope, and principle of a transforming activity." 62 permits the beginning of history." 64 In Genesis 1, however, it is creation that permits the beginning of history. Is Brueggemann, like Trigo, straining towards creano ex nihilo in his attempt to root liberation in the unfettered, transcendent God of the scriptures?
If so, he clearly never arrives there. On the contrary, Brueggemann's dyadic hermeneutical scheme is in danger of moving instead in the direction of one version of the chaos-cosmos scheme against which Trigo cautions. In this left-wing version-a version that tempts liberation theologians and base communities-the terms of the schema are simply reversed, resulting in the valorizing of the chaotic marginalized and the demonization of those who stand for false order.
65 I am certainly not claiming that Brueggemann's dyadic schema of "prophetic imagination" and "royal consciousness" is simply a version of the chaos-cosmos setting as Trigo describes it. That would be an oversimplistic reduction. Nevertheless, upon considering the major trajectory of his work, culminating especially in Israel's Praise, I sense that Brueggemann's genuinely insightful and liberating hermeneutic of suspicion may be on the way to hardening into a dogmatic orientation that ignores, if not suppresses, alternative readings.
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• The Promise of a Triadic Hermeneutic
If Brueggemann took seriously his own triadic hermeneutic of orientation, disorientation, and new orientation from The Message of the Psalms, a hermeneutic informed by his conversation with John Goldingay and by the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, to whom he continually appeals, he might be able to reevaluate the significance of creation theology in the Bible. In a preliminary exploration of his triadic hermeneutic in a 1980 article entitled "Psalms and the Life of Faith: A Suggested Typology of Function," Brueggemann noted that liberating psalms of new orientation could come to be read as jaded psalms of old orientation when distanced from the salvific experience that produced them. Goldingay responded by pointing out that the opposite could also occur: jaded psalms of orientation could likewise be joyously transformed in the perception of the reader by a fresh, liberating experience of God. Drawing upon Claus Westermann's notion of 64 Ibid., 21. 65 Trigo, Creation and History. 79-80. 86. 66 Brueggemann himself has recently admitted that his royal-prophetic schema may need revision. Since studies by Gottwald and others in the 1980s revealed that the discontinuity between early Israelite retribalization and the subsequent monarchy is not quite as radical as Brueggemann had portrayed it, Brueggemann has acknowledged (Interpretation and Obedience, ix-x) that this "might in time to come lead to a less absolute contrast in the articulation of my argument." a "circle of praise" in the Babylonian psalter, 67 Goldingay proposed that underlying the various biblical psalms was a hermeneutical cycle or spiral of the life of faith. This cycle moved in and out of old and new orientation either through a satiated forgetting of God or through disorientation and a subsequent renewed experience of God's salvation. 68 Brueggemann acknowledged the value of Goldingay's suggestion both in a brief response article and in The Message of the Psalms. 69 Goldingay and Brueggemann agreed that neither the theme or topic of a particular psalmsuch as creation-nor its form-critical classification, nor even its original social function determined whether that psalm would in fact function oppressively or in a liberating manner. Rather, the hermeneutical stance of the reader was decisive for the way in which the psalm functioned. 70 rience.
72 Nevertheless, Brueggemann dedicates only a single footnote to what is perhaps the most famous element of Ricoeur's hermeneutics, namely, Ricoeur's account of the multiple ways in which texts can be read once they are severed by historical distance from their original contexts. 73 This is strange, for Ricoeur's account of such multiple readings points decisively to the ongoing reworking of tradition within both scripture and contemporary interpreting communities, and Brueggemann is intensely aware of both. 74 Admittedly, a reader-response hermeneutic may harbor the potential for rationalizing shoddy scholarship, idiosyncratic readings, and a relativistic ethic if applied incautiously to scripture. The potential for a relativistic ethic may in particular explain Brueggemann's avoidance of this aspect of Ricoeur's hermeneutics. 75 Nevertheless, its importance here is in corroborating Brueggemann's triadic hermeneutic of orientation, disorientation, and new orientation as a heuristic schema for correlating biblical texts with the ongoing experience of the interpreting community. What both Ricoeur's hermeneutics and the discussion with Goldingay clearly indicate is that whether or not creation originally functioned to legitimate the status quo in ancient Israel, it is not necessary that it fulfill this function. 76 On the contrary, with a new set of readers, creation may function in a revolutionary and liberating manner.
m Concluding Unscientific Postscript haps telling that I was troubled initially because his judgment simply did not fit my experience. As a young theological student in Kingston, Jamaica, in the mid-1970s, I was grappling with issues of liberation, postcolonialism and the contextualization of the gospel. Along with a number of my fellow Caribbean students, I found creation to be an explosive category, profoundly liberating from otherworldly pietism and empowering for redemptive activity in a world that belongs to God. This paper thus represents the raising of a voice in pain as a disorienting protest against Brueggemann's assertions about the social function of creation theology. Given his own hermeneutics, he must take this protest seriously.
In conclusion, then, I call upon Brueggemann to take seriously my claim that his position on creation theology, although well ordered, does not do justice to the realities of experience. This claim is admittedly a minor correction to a powerful and fresh biblical hermeneutic which I largely appreciate. 77 Nevertheless, perhaps the time is now ripe for Brueggemann to begin developing, in line with his insightful, although atypical, Genesis commentary, a biblically rooted, coherently articulated theology of creation that knows the darkness and yet hopes, beyond suspicion, in the Creator's gracious and just purposes for this world. 78 1984 book, The Message of the Psalms, is indicated by the systematic replacement of the earlier term "reorientation" with the later "new orientation"; this may testify to Brueggemann's growing sense of the radical discontinuity between mere return to an old orientation and genuine newness. 77 Let me emphasize that my criticisms occur in the context of deep appreciation for Brueggemann's work. I believe Emil Brunner's comments (Natural Theology. 59) about Karl Barth are, with appropriate changes, applicable here: "I do not wish to blame [Walter Brueggemann] for neglecting and discrediting creation theology. God uses the genius of one-sidedness. . . . It may be [Brueggemann' s] special mission to serve at this point as a counter-weight to dangerous abberations. . . . But the Church must not be thrown from one extreme to the other. In the long run the Church can bear the rejection of creation theology as little as its misuse. It is the task of our theological generation to find the way back to a true [creation theology]." I have replaced Brunner's references to "natural theology" or "theologia naturalis" with "creation theology," which is what he actually meant, as is widely recognized.
78 A significant move towards this articulation may be found in Brueggemann's more recent book, Texts Under Negotiation: The Bible and Postmodern Imagination (Minneapolis: Fortress. 1993); see chap. 2, esp. 29-39, for his positive construal of creation as gift.
